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Floop 2: Pragmatism: a Glossary. An annotation.
'''Floop 2: Pragmatism: a Glossary. An Annotation'''


Premise: The pragmatist approach acknowledges “minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react […] "it takes mind in the midst of all its concrete relations” <ref> James Psychology</ref>
Premise: The pragmatist approach acknowledges “minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react” <ref> James ''Principles of Psychology'' (1890)</ref>
Floop 2 aims to thicken the relation between the classic pragmatism of James and Dewey and the classic cybernetics of Wiener and Bateson (see <ref> https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=Main_Page</ref>). These converging epistemologies set a trail toward our own moment of ecological disaster, but they also lead to a common ground on which our own agency can be understood and asserted.  On this terrain, the subject need not retreat into the idealism which James warned against, which “treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties.” <ref> James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890</ref> In Floop 2 the radical empiricism and materialism of Pragmatism meets the post-humanism of cybernetics to propose an aesthetic of experience for our own devastated era.
Floop 2 aims to thicken the relation between the pragmatism of James and Dewey and the cybernetics of Wiener and Bateson (see <ref> https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=Main_Page</ref>). These converging epistemologies set a trail toward our own moment of ecological disaster, but they also lead to a common ground on which our own agency can be understood and asserted.  <ref>On this terrain, the subject need not retreat into the idealism which James warned against, which “treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties.” James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890 In Floop 2 the radical empiricism and materialism of Pragmatism meets the post-humanism of cybernetics to propose an aesthetic of experience for our own devastated era.</ref>




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Ruth Anna Pulman’s essay ''Taking Pragmatism Seriously'' makes a useful distinction between the ''Pragmaticism'' of C. S. Pierce (which emphasises a ''semiotic'') and the ''Pragmatism'' of William James and John Dewey (which emphasises experience, psychology, ethics, aesthetics (esthetics) and pedagogy). <ref>in Hilery Pulman & Ruth Anna Pulman; Pragmatism as a Way of Life The Lasting Legacy of William James and John Dewey, Harvard 2017</ref> ''Floop 2: Pragmatism: a Glossary'', will address the second, which will go under the shorthand of ''the Pragmatism of experience''.
Ruth Anna Pulman’s essay ''Taking Pragmatism Seriously'' makes a useful distinction between the ''Pragmaticism'' of C. S. Pierce (which emphasises a ''semiotic'') and ''the Pragmatism of experience'' of William James and John Dewey <ref>in Hilery Pulman & Ruth Anna Pulman; Pragmatism as a Way of Life The Lasting Legacy of William James and John Dewey, Harvard 2017</ref> ''Floop 2'' will address the second.


* note
* note


William James’ ''Principles of Psychology'' (1890) contains a sustained reply to Herbert Spencer’s own ''Principles of Psychology'' (1855).
William James’ ''Principles of Psychology'' (1890) contains a sustained reply to Herbert Spencer’s own ''Principles of Psychology'' (1855).
To contemporary readers Herbert Spencer is remembered for two grave epistemological misnomers that have plague us from the nineteenth century to today. Firstly Spencer, an enthusiastic champion of Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection, popularised the notion of “the survival of the fittest”. This opposed the more scientifically precise idea that those best adapted to their environment are best equipped to survive within it. The second of Spencer's thought crimes was to encourage  idea of “social Darwinism”, which has been a boon to the politics of self-interest and structural inequality since. <ref>See:Johnathan Hodge, Gregory Radick Eds. ''The Cambridge Companion to Darwin'', 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2009 (1st edition in 2003); listen also to In Our Time – Social Darwinism: Adam Cooper, Gregory Radick, Charlotte Sleigh in: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03vgq1q</ref>
To contemporary readers Herbert Spencer is remembered as the father of two grave epistemological misnomers. Firstly, Spencer, an enthusiastic champion of Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection, popularised the notion of “the survival of the fittest”. This opposed the more scientifically precise idea that those best adapted to their environment are best equipped to survive within it. The second of Spencer's thought crimes was to encourage  the idea of “social Darwinism”, which has served as a boon to the politics of self-interest and structural inequality to this day. <ref>See:Johnathan Hodge, Gregory Radick Eds. ''The Cambridge Companion to Darwin'', 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2009 (1st edition in 2003); listen also to In Our Time – Social Darwinism: Adam Cooper, Gregory Radick, Charlotte Sleigh in: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03vgq1q</ref>


[[File:Spencer.jpg|300px|thumb|Herbert Spencer the Bastard]]
[[File:Spencer.jpg|300px|thumb|Herbert Spencer was a Bastard]]


But William James, in his own ''Principles of Psychology''(1890), finds a lot of Pragmatism in Spencer’s approach to psychology. Principally, Spencer’s definition of experience as 'the adjustment of inner to outer relations'. <ref>Spencer in James The Principles of Psychology, 1890</ref> James is quick to clarify the importance of this “adjustment” to Pragmatism, acknowledging its value as an idea that can be built upon […] “because it takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react; because, in short, it takes mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, it is immensely more fertile than the old-fashioned 'rational psychology,' which treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties.”<ref>James Psychology</ref>
But William James, in his own ''Principles of Psychology''(1890), finds a lot of Pragmatism in Spencer’s approach to psychology. Principally, Spencer’s definition of experience as 'the adjustment of inner to outer relations'. <ref>Spencer in James The Principles of Psychology, 1890</ref> James is quick to clarify the importance of this “adjustment” to Pragmatism, acknowledging its value as an idea that can be built upon […] “because it takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react; because, in short, it takes mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, it is immensely more fertile than the old-fashioned 'rational psychology,' which treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties.”<ref>James Psychology</ref>


An epistemology which “takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react” <ref>James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890</ref> serves as a prelude to the theory of purpose outlined by cybernetician Norbert Wiener <ref> Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow, Behavior, Purpose and Teleology, Philosophy of Science 10 p. 15 </ref>and the ecologically orientated “second order cybernetics” ushered in by Gregory Bateson <ref> Bateson, Steps to and Ecology of Mind</ref>. James follows Spencer further still in citing Spencer’s observation that there is no “break” between the “phenomena of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life." <ref> Spencer in James, The Principles of Psychology</ref>  
*note
 
An epistemology which “takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react” <ref>James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890</ref> serves as a prelude to the theory of purpose outlined by cybernetician Norbert Wiener<ref> Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow, Behavior, Purpose and Teleology, Philosophy of Science 10 p. 15 </ref>and the ecologically orientated “second order cybernetics” ushered in by Gregory Bateson <ref> Bateson, Steps to and Ecology of Mind</ref>. James follows Spencer further still in citing Spencer’s observation that there is no “break” between the “phenomena of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life." <ref> Spencer in James, The Principles of Psychology</ref> <ref> Wiener, in his biography:"Following the advice of Bertrand Russell, I studied with John Dewey" [at Harvard]</ref>


* note
* note


James and Dewey speak of mind is embodied, reactive and adaptive. The pragmatism of experience, therefore, acknowledges the materiality of the elements that form it. James has his predecessors, which are also evident in the cannon of cybernetics. In 1863 Samual Butler in Darwin Amongst the Machines, also proposed that mind was embodied, reactive and adaptive;<ref>S. Butler: Darwin Among the Machines (1863)</ref> In the era of cybernetics, Butler’s mantel was taken up by Gregory Bateson who proposed an ecology of mind, in which there was no clear division between mind and environment. Like the cybernaticians that followed, the Pragmatists of experience rejected the idealism where the dialectic movement of better and better ideas drove mind to perfection (a notion inherited by Freud and Lacan).
James and Dewey speak of mind as embodied, reactive and adaptive. The pragmatism of experience, therefore, acknowledges the materiality of the elements that form it. James has his predecessors, which are also evident in the cannon of cybernetics. In 1863 Samual Butler in Darwin Amongst the Machines, also proposed that mind was embodied, reactive and adaptive;<ref>S. Butler: Darwin Among the Machines (1863)</ref> In the era of cybernetics, Butler’s mantel was taken up by Gregory Bateson who proposed an ecology of mind, in which there was no clear division between mind and environment.  
William James’ star pupil Gertrude Stein acknowledges as much in the form of Tender Buttons, in which text is exposed as text as such (the radical move of dada-surrealism was to render existing text and images that could be reconfigured to render the “dialectical image”) <ref> Walter Benjamin in Buck-Morss, Susan. The Dialectics of Seeing. The MIT Press, 1991</ref>. and in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, which spoke of the “self” (Gertrude) as other, through the “experience” of another (Alice) <ref> Stein, G. The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas. Penguin 2001 [1933]; https://monoskop.org/images/6/62/Stein_Gertrude_Tender_Buttons_1997.pdf </ref> Italo Calvino, in Cybernetics and Ghosts, also understood that that work with text must work with a radical materiality which challenges “literature” as an institution. <ref> https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=WRITING_–_CALVINO-SOFTWARE-CYBERNETICS </ref> If literature is to be more than a set of possible combinations, or OuLiPo algorithms<ref> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oulipo</ref>, or a post structuralist hall of mirrors (in which one thing or another is more or less interesting),<ref> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Leaves</ref> it must speak through embodied, emergent experience. In the light of the pragmatism of experience I understand a function of literature as a constant coming into consciousness.


* note
William James’ star pupil Gertrude Stein acknowledges the continuity between mind and matter in ''Tender Buttons'', in which text is exposed as in its materiality. The radical move of dada-surrealism was to reconfigured texts and images to render the “dialectical image”. <ref> Walter Benjamin in Buck-Morss, Susan. ''The Dialectics of Seeing''. The MIT Press, 1991</ref> In ''The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas'' Stein spoke of the “self” (Gertrude) as other, through the “experience” of another (Alice) <ref> Stein, G. ''The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas''. Penguin, 2001 [1933]; https://monoskop.org/images/6/62/Stein_Gertrude_Tender_Buttons_1997.pdf </ref> Italo Calvino, in Cybernetics and Ghosts, also understood that those who work with text must work with a radical materiality which challenges “literature” as an institution. <ref> https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=WRITING_–_CALVINO-SOFTWARE-CYBERNETICS </ref> If literature is to be more than a set of possible combinations, or OuLiPo algorithms<ref> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oulipo</ref>, or a post structuralist hall of mirrors (in which one thing or another is ''more or less'' interesting),<ref> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Leaves</ref> it must speak through embodied, emergent experience. Perhaps a function of literature is a constant coming into consciousness.
* note
Like the cybernaticians that followed, the pragmatists of experience rejected an idealism in which the dialectical movement of better and better ideas moved toward the perfection of mind (although this misnomer was inherited by Freud and Lacan).


* note  
* note  


The relation between James’ practice of experimental psychology and that of cyberneticians Grey Walters, Ross Ashby, Kenneth Craik, Lawrence S. Kubie and Warren McCulloch is touched upon in Fabulous Loop de Loop (Floop)<ref>https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=Main_Page</ref>. When Kenneth Craik claims “[...] our brains and minds are part of a continuous causal chain” <ref>see Craik’s hylozoist conception of mind and consciousness in Floop</ref> he is in the same epistemological territory as the pragmatists of experience. The epistemology of the cyberneticians who were also world leaders is the field of experimentalpsychology, attempted to make material models of the activities of the human brain (Ashby, Walters, Craik) which was derived from the empirical practice of William James. The work of Gregory Bateson which applies cybernetic ideas to psychology, anthropology, ecology and aesthetics, also acknowledges that there is no “break” between the “phenomena of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life." And that the interaction with the environment… The cyberneticians’ antipathy to Freudian psychoanalysis (McCulloch and Bateson particularly), follows the same logic of embodiment and experience as James and Dewey.
The relation between James’ clinical practice of experimental psychology and that of cyberneticians Grey Walters, Ross Ashby, Kenneth Craik, Lawrence S. Kubie and Warren McCulloch is touched upon in Fabulous Loop de Loop (Floop)<ref>https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=Main_Page</ref>. When Kenneth Craik claims “[...] our brains and minds are part of a continuous causal chain” <ref>see Craik’s hylozoist conception of mind and consciousness in Floop</ref> he is in the same epistemological territory as the pragmatists of experience. The epistemology of the cyberneticians who were also world leaders is the field of experimental psychology, attempted to make material models of the activities of the human brain (Ashby, Walters, Craik) which was derived from the empirical practice of William James. The work of Gregory Bateson which applies cybernetic ideas to psychology, anthropology, ecology and aesthetics, also acknowledges that there is no “break” between mind and environment. <ref> Bateson, STEM</ref>
 
* note
 
The cyberneticians’ antipathy to Freudian psychoanalysis (McCulloch and Bateson particularly), follows the same logic of embodiment and experience articulated by James and Dewey.

Latest revision as of 11:44, 1 April 2024

Floop 2: Pragmatism: a Glossary. An Annotation

Premise: The pragmatist approach acknowledges “minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react” [1] Floop 2 aims to thicken the relation between the pragmatism of James and Dewey and the cybernetics of Wiener and Bateson (see [2]). These converging epistemologies set a trail toward our own moment of ecological disaster, but they also lead to a common ground on which our own agency can be understood and asserted. [3]


Floop 2 is a glossary of terms:

[these words arranged in a loop de loop]

Experience

Esthetic

Adaptation

Consciousness

Drift

Movement

Rhythm

Undergoing

Unity


  • note

Ruth Anna Pulman’s essay Taking Pragmatism Seriously makes a useful distinction between the Pragmaticism of C. S. Pierce (which emphasises a semiotic) and the Pragmatism of experience of William James and John Dewey [4] Floop 2 will address the second.

  • note

William James’ Principles of Psychology (1890) contains a sustained reply to Herbert Spencer’s own Principles of Psychology (1855). To contemporary readers Herbert Spencer is remembered as the father of two grave epistemological misnomers. Firstly, Spencer, an enthusiastic champion of Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection, popularised the notion of “the survival of the fittest”. This opposed the more scientifically precise idea that those best adapted to their environment are best equipped to survive within it. The second of Spencer's thought crimes was to encourage the idea of “social Darwinism”, which has served as a boon to the politics of self-interest and structural inequality to this day. [5]

Herbert Spencer was a Bastard

But William James, in his own Principles of Psychology(1890), finds a lot of Pragmatism in Spencer’s approach to psychology. Principally, Spencer’s definition of experience as 'the adjustment of inner to outer relations'. [6] James is quick to clarify the importance of this “adjustment” to Pragmatism, acknowledging its value as an idea that can be built upon […] “because it takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react; because, in short, it takes mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, it is immensely more fertile than the old-fashioned 'rational psychology,' which treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties.”[7]

  • note

An epistemology which “takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react” [8] serves as a prelude to the theory of purpose outlined by cybernetician Norbert Wiener[9]and the ecologically orientated “second order cybernetics” ushered in by Gregory Bateson [10]. James follows Spencer further still in citing Spencer’s observation that there is no “break” between the “phenomena of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life." [11] [12]

  • note

James and Dewey speak of mind as embodied, reactive and adaptive. The pragmatism of experience, therefore, acknowledges the materiality of the elements that form it. James has his predecessors, which are also evident in the cannon of cybernetics. In 1863 Samual Butler in Darwin Amongst the Machines, also proposed that mind was embodied, reactive and adaptive;[13] In the era of cybernetics, Butler’s mantel was taken up by Gregory Bateson who proposed an ecology of mind, in which there was no clear division between mind and environment.

  • note

William James’ star pupil Gertrude Stein acknowledges the continuity between mind and matter in Tender Buttons, in which text is exposed as in its materiality. The radical move of dada-surrealism was to reconfigured texts and images to render the “dialectical image”. [14] In The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas Stein spoke of the “self” (Gertrude) as other, through the “experience” of another (Alice) [15] Italo Calvino, in Cybernetics and Ghosts, also understood that those who work with text must work with a radical materiality which challenges “literature” as an institution. [16] If literature is to be more than a set of possible combinations, or OuLiPo algorithms[17], or a post structuralist hall of mirrors (in which one thing or another is more or less interesting),[18] it must speak through embodied, emergent experience. Perhaps a function of literature is a constant coming into consciousness.

  • note

Like the cybernaticians that followed, the pragmatists of experience rejected an idealism in which the dialectical movement of better and better ideas moved toward the perfection of mind (although this misnomer was inherited by Freud and Lacan).

  • note

The relation between James’ clinical practice of experimental psychology and that of cyberneticians Grey Walters, Ross Ashby, Kenneth Craik, Lawrence S. Kubie and Warren McCulloch is touched upon in Fabulous Loop de Loop (Floop)[19]. When Kenneth Craik claims “[...] our brains and minds are part of a continuous causal chain” [20] he is in the same epistemological territory as the pragmatists of experience. The epistemology of the cyberneticians who were also world leaders is the field of experimental psychology, attempted to make material models of the activities of the human brain (Ashby, Walters, Craik) which was derived from the empirical practice of William James. The work of Gregory Bateson which applies cybernetic ideas to psychology, anthropology, ecology and aesthetics, also acknowledges that there is no “break” between mind and environment. [21]

  • note

The cyberneticians’ antipathy to Freudian psychoanalysis (McCulloch and Bateson particularly), follows the same logic of embodiment and experience articulated by James and Dewey.

  1. ↑ James Principles of Psychology (1890)
  2. ↑ https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=Main_Page
  3. ↑ On this terrain, the subject need not retreat into the idealism which James warned against, which “treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties.” James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890 In Floop 2 the radical empiricism and materialism of Pragmatism meets the post-humanism of cybernetics to propose an aesthetic of experience for our own devastated era.
  4. ↑ in Hilery Pulman & Ruth Anna Pulman; Pragmatism as a Way of Life The Lasting Legacy of William James and John Dewey, Harvard 2017
  5. ↑ See:Johnathan Hodge, Gregory Radick Eds. The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2009 (1st edition in 2003); listen also to In Our Time – Social Darwinism: Adam Cooper, Gregory Radick, Charlotte Sleigh in: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03vgq1q
  6. ↑ Spencer in James The Principles of Psychology, 1890
  7. ↑ James Psychology
  8. ↑ James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890
  9. ↑ Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow, Behavior, Purpose and Teleology, Philosophy of Science 10 p. 15
  10. ↑ Bateson, Steps to and Ecology of Mind
  11. ↑ Spencer in James, The Principles of Psychology
  12. ↑ Wiener, in his biography:"Following the advice of Bertrand Russell, I studied with John Dewey" [at Harvard]
  13. ↑ S. Butler: Darwin Among the Machines (1863)
  14. ↑ Walter Benjamin in Buck-Morss, Susan. The Dialectics of Seeing. The MIT Press, 1991
  15. ↑ Stein, G. The Autobiography of Alice B Toklas. Penguin, 2001 [1933]; https://monoskop.org/images/6/62/Stein_Gertrude_Tender_Buttons_1997.pdf
  16. ↑ https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=WRITING_–_CALVINO-SOFTWARE-CYBERNETICS
  17. ↑ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oulipo
  18. ↑ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Leaves
  19. ↑ https://hub.xpub.nl/rushtonhosts/fabulousloopdeloop/index.php?title=Main_Page
  20. ↑ see Craik’s hylozoist conception of mind and consciousness in Floop
  21. ↑ Bateson, STEM
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